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Energy markets were not immune to the 2007 financial crisis.  Growth in the Indian and 
Chinese economies is placing strains on global energy supplies that could force a repeat of the 
2008 price spike of $145/bbl for crude oil.  Emerging market growth coupled with inefficiencies, 
frictions, and speculation in the energy markets has the potential to create drastic economic 
shocks throughout the world.  
The 2007 economic crisis has pushed back investment in energy projects where a low-
growth scenario in world GDP could create drastic price increases in world energy prices.  
Without a long-term energy supply plan, the U.S. is destined to see growth reduced and its trade 
imbalances continue to deteriorate with increasing energy costs. 
Analysis of the U.S. natural gas futures markets and the impact of financial speculation 
on natural gas market pricing determined that financial speculation adds to price movements in 
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The U.S. is the world’s largest energy consumer, using roughly 99.3 quadrillion btus of 
energy in 2008.1  Roughly 31% of the U.S. energy supply is from imports, which raises questions 
of national security as well as balance of payment concerns.  The 2007 financial crisis has 
curtailed business investment, and in the energy sector, where large projects can take decades to 
develop, a potential crisis is brewing.  Due to a lack of energy development and the recent BP 
Gulf of Mexico crisis, energy prices could eclipse the $145/bbl price crude oil set in 2008.   
Decline rates in natural gas and crude oil production require development of new 
reserves to maintain current production levels.  As economies worldwide recover from the 2007 
financial crisis, a sudden surge in economic growth could bring a commensurate spike in energy 
demand that could drive prices beyond the 2008 highs and destroy what appears to be a 
prolonged and fragile economic recovery in the U.S. 
Commodity speculation was identified as a potential driver to the sudden surge in 2008 
energy prices.  Sanders, Irwin, and Merrin analyzed commodity futures and determined that 
index fund positions across futures markets have no impact on relative price changes across 
those markets.2  However, Sanders, Boris, and Manfredo in 2004 asserted that “A positive  
                                                
 
1U.S. Energy Information Administration, “2008 Energy Review,” http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/archive/aeo08/, 2008, p. 
3, (accessed October 15, 2010).   
2 Dwight R. Sanders, Scott H. Irwin, Robert  P. Merrin, “A Speculative Bubble in Commodity Futures Prices? 
Cross-Sectional Evidence,” (Paper presented at the NCCC-134 Conference on Applied Commodity Price Analysis, 







correlation between returns and positions held by noncommercial traders, and a negative 
correlation between commercial positions and market returns are found.”3   
Whether or not bubbles in the commodity markets are fueled by “hot money” is a 
subject debated by many in the academic and financial world, but as Irwin, Sanders, and Merrin 
noted, “for every long there is a short, for everyone who thinks the price is going up there is 
someone who thinks it is going down, and for everyone who trades with the flow of the market, 
there is someone trading against it.  These are zero-sum markets where all money flows must by 
definition be set to zero.”4   
The laws of supply and demand still function in the futures markets, and if supply or 
demand is overrun by hot money, it would stand to reason that bubbles could be created in the 
futures markets.  In Bubbles and Crashes by Abreu and Brunnermeir, a model is developed from 
an efficient market perspective.  Yet the authors argue that bubbles can survive despite the 
presence of rational arbitrageurs where “behavioral agents” or animal spirits lead to momentum 
trading, trend chasing, and the like. 5  For decades, the U.S. has been the dominant player in the 
energy markets, but today China will impact the energy trade like no other county in the world. 6 
Non-OECD  (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries led by  
                                                
 
3 Dwight R. Sanders, Keith Boris, Mark Manfred, “Hedgers, funds, and small speculators in the energy futures 
markets: an analysis of the CFTC’s Commitments of Traders reports,” Energy Economics Volume 26, Issue 3 (May 
2004), p. 1. 
4 Dwight R. Sanders, Scott H. Irwin, and Robert Merring, “Devil or Angel?  The Role of Speculation in the Recent 
Commodity Price Boom and Bust,” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 41, 2, (August 2009), p. 379. 
5 Dilip Abreu, Markus Brunnermeit, “Bubbles and Crashes,” Econometrica Vol. 71 No. 1 (January, 2003), p. 173. 
6 Antony Froggatt and Glada Lahn , Lloyds 360o Risk Insight, “Sustainable Energy Security,” 
http://www.lloyds.com/News-and-Insight/360-Risk-Insight/Research-and-Reports/Energy-Security/Energy-Security, 
2010, p. 9, (accessed October 1, 2010).	  
  
3 
 China and India are reshaping world energy demand.  Projections into 2015 note a tipping point 
where Asia-Pacific countries need more imported oil than the Middle East can provide.7 
Recently the debates regarding greenhouse gases and renewable energy have brought 
U.S. energy policies into focus.  However, based on the 2006 NPC U.S. Energy study, fossil 
fuels will remain a dominant source of energy in the United States.  The U.S. is fortunate to have 
an abundant supply of coal and natural gas that would allow it to become more energy self-
sufficient if those resources were used with an emphasis on both market and thermal efficiency.  
Studies by the IEA (International Energy Agency), EIA (Energy Information 
Administration), and NPC (National Petroleum Council) all point to increased energy demand 
growth in the 2030-2035 time frame.  There is considerable uncertainty as to where future 
supplies will come from.  Cheap energy has been a boom for globalization.  As an example: 
• Raw materials mined in Australia are shipped to China for processing into steel. 
• The steel can then be shipped to another country for manufacturing into an intermediate 
good.   
• That intermediate good is then shipped to yet another country for assembly into the final 
product.   




                                                
 






The point is that low-priced energy has allowed industrialization to take advantage of 
cheap labor throughout the world, but that could all change if crude were to spike to over 
$150/bbl.   Massive increases in energy costs will cause transportation costs to outweigh the 





Figure 1. IEA World Primary Energy Demand8 
1 toe (ton oil equivalent) = 7.33 boe (barrel oil equivalent) –or- 1 mtoe = 7,330,000 boe 
  
                                                
 
8 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2009,” http://www.iea.org/weo/2009.asp, 2009, p. 75, 





U.S. AND WORLD ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
 
The United States ranks first in world oil consumption followed by China, Japan, India, 
Russia, Germany, and Brazil.9  Historically, OECD countries have been the key consumers that 
have driven world energy demand, but the emerging markets of China and India are reshaping 
the energy demand as their economies grow.  As in the OECD countries, the growth in 
transportation fuels is becoming a significant component in the growth of these emerging 
markets. 
Projections of world energy use are available from a variety of sources.  
• EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration) 
• IEA (International Energy Association) 
• OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) 
• BP (British Petroleum) 
• NPC (National Petroleum Council) 
• Academic Papers (Dargay and Gately)  
                                                
 
9 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Review 2009,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/pdf/aer.pdf, 








All of the analyses of future energy demand by the above sources in the 2030-2035 
timeframe project that hydrocarbon fuels will remain a key component in the world’s energy 
portfolio.  Furthermore, coal use will continue to grow to meet the demands of emerging 
countries such as India and China.  China’s coal demand is outpacing its domestic production, 
which is forcing the country to import coal to satisfy its markets.  Similar to China, industrial 
growth in India has created electrical shortages of up to 14% of demand.  India’s plan to close 
their electrical gap is to construct coal-fueled electrical power plants. 
Based on the following U.S. energy prices, a comparison can be made of fuel costs when 
converted to a common energy basis. 
Petroleum  $85/bbl (1 bbl = 5,800,000 btu) 
Natural Gas  $4.00/mmbtu (1 mmbtu = 1,000,000 btu) 
Coal  $12.35/short ton (Cheap Coal 8,800 btu/lb),  
            $62.75/short ton (Expensive Coal 13,000 btu/lb) 
 
As shown in Table 1, coal is the least expensive fuel on a mmbtu basis. 
The energy prices in Table 1 do not reflect transportation costs nor do they take into 
account the costs of the externalities associated with hydrocarbon fuels.  In the U.S. as in many 
OECD countries, there has been a push toward green or renewable energy that has a minimal or 
even zero carbon footprint.  However, as the NPC points out in its “Hard Truths” energy 
analysis, green and renewable energy are incapable of providing the world’s energy needs by 
 
Table 1.  U.S. Energy Equivalent Pricing 
Fuel $/mmbtu 
Petroleum $14.66 
Natural Gas $4.00 





themselves. Therefore, countries throughout the world are facing a difficult decision as to how to 
weigh energy security, cost, and the externalities that society must bear given the type of energy 
used.  Table 2 shows the various pollutant emissions for the common energy sources used 
throughout the world. 
The externality most often discussed with hydrocarbon fuels is GHG (Greenhouse 
Gases).  When GHGs are taken into account, coal becomes the hydrocarbon fuel with the highest 
externality.  Until a carbon tax is initiated worldwide, corporations will be able to shift 
production from countries with carbon taxes to those without.  Global warming caused by 
greenhouse gases has the potential to cause further economic hardships due to drastic swings in 
weather.  Periods of extreme hot, cold, dry, and wet will impact food production, transportation, 
and industrial production. 
 
Table 2. Fossil Fuel Emissions (Pounds per Billion btu of energy input)10 
Pollutant Natural Gas Oil Coal 
Carbon Dioxide 117,000 164,000 208,000 
Carbon Monoxide 40 33 208 
Nitrogen Oxides 92 448 457 
Sulfur Dioxide 1 1,122 2,591 
Particulates 7 84 2,744 




                                                
 
10 Natural Gas, “Natural Gas and the Environment,” http://www.naturalgas.org/environment/naturalgas.asp, 






The world is facing the potential of an acute energy shortage based on the growth in the 
emerging markets and the lack of a comprehensive energy plan.  The U.S. has continued without 
a comprehensive energy plan since peak petroleum production occurred in 1970.  The specter of  
“peak oil” as shown in Figure 2 is sometimes discussed where world oil production will peak and 




Figure 2. U.S. Crude and Natural Gas Plant Liquids Production11  
                                                
 
11 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Review 2009,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/pdf/aer.pdf, 




Opponents of the peak oil theory note that technical innovations such as 3D seismic, 
hydraulic fracturing, and deep water drilling have brought reserves to the market that have been 
able to satisfy world demand.  However, given the recent economic slowdown coupled with the 
time it takes to develop significant energy projects, the world’s surplus energy production is 
dwindling rapidly.  By 2015, Lloyds of London predicts that Asia-Pacific demand will surpass 
Middle East surplus capacity (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Middle East Oil Surplus versus Asia-Pacific Oil Deficit12 
 
                                                
 
12 Antony Froggatt and Glada Lahn , Lloyds 360o Risk Insight, “Sustainable Energy Security,” 
http://www.lloyds.com/News-and-Insight/360-Risk-Insight/Research-and-Reports/Energy-Security/Energy-Security, 






The 2007 Financial Crisis Impact on Energy Production 
The 2007 Financial Crisis has impacted markets throughout the globe.  The energy 
markets were not immune.  Shortly after the crisis, oil reached a high of $145/bbl in July 2008 
only to retreat to a low of $37/bbl in December 2008.  Faced with a period of price uncertainty, 
energy companies began to curtail energy projects.  The long duration of energy projects and the 
NPV (Net Present Value) used to evaluate their economics make them extremely sensitive to 
pricing in the early years of production.  Prior to the recent plunge in interest rates, firms used a 
cost of capital of 8 to 10 percent to determine whether projects generated positive cash flow.  In 
addition to the cost of capital, project risk factors also impact return hurdle rates, which vary by 
corporation. 
Given the tentative economic outlook, along with the current price uncertainty, many 
energy companies have chosen to forego energy exploration and development and rather obtain 
reserves through acquisitions or attempt to increase shareholder value by buy-back of shares.  On 
October 4, 2010, Chevron Corporation announced a buy-back program of up to $1 billion.   
Exxon-Mobil has utilized a similar strategy of stock buy-backs to boost share price.  Sixty 
percent of Exxon’s cash flow or $29 billion was spent on stock repurchases in 2006.13   Prior to 
Chevron’s recent repurchase announcement, it bought back some $4.5 billion of its stock in 
2006, vs. $2.6 billion the prior year. Overall, the industry spent $52.4 billion on buybacks last 
year, nearly double the amount in 2005.14  
 
                                                
 
13 Businessweek, “Pumping Cash, Not Oil,” http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_22/b4036057.htm, 
May 28, 2007,  (accessed November 5, 2010). 
14 Businessweek, “Pumping Cash, Not Oil.” 
  
11 
Meanwhile the IEA estimates that world energy investment needs $16 trillion through 
2030 to maintain and expand energy supply.15  An estimated investment of $4 trillion is needed 
in upstream investment in the oil and gas sector to maintain existing production.16  Investments 
of these magnitudes require a consistent approach to project development and execution to 
counter decline rates in existing production as well as discover new sources of energy.  Using the  
$4 trillion investment figure mentioned above, the oil and gas industry would need to maintain 
an average investment rate of $200 billion/year to achieve the IEA threshold.   
The IEA outlines the following future energy challenges and opportunities:17 
The financial crisis brings a temporary reprieve from rising fossil energy use 
Global energy use is set to fall in 2009 — for the first time since 1981 on any significant 
scale — as a result of the financial and economic crisis; but, on current policies, it would 
quickly resume its long-term upward trend once economic recovery is underway. In our 
Reference Scenario, world primary energy demand is projected to increase by 1.5% per 
year between 2007 and 2030, from just over 12 000 million tonnes of oil equivalent 
(Mtoe) to 16 800 Mtoe — an overall increase of 40%. Developing Asian countries are the 
main drivers of this growth, followed by the Middle East. Projected demand growth is 
slower than in WEO-2008, reflecting mainly the impact of the crisis in the early part of 
the projection period, as well as of new government policies introduced during the past 
year. On average, demand declines marginally in 2007-2010, as a result of a sharp drop in 
2009 — preliminary data point to a fall in that year of up to 2%. Demand growth 
rebounds thereafter, averaging 2.5% per year in 2010-2015. The pace of demand growth 
slackens progressively after 2015, as emerging economies mature and global population 
growth slows. 
 
Fossil fuels remain the dominant sources of primary energy worldwide in the Reference 
Scenario, accounting for more than three-quarters of the overall increase in energy use 
between 2007 and 2030. In absolute terms, coal sees by far the biggest increase in 
demand over the projection period, followed by gas and oil. Yet oil remains the single 
largest fuel in the primary fuel mix in 2030, even though its share drops, from 34% now  
                                                
 
15 International Energy Agency, Press Release, http://www.iea.org/press/pressdetail.asp?PRESS_REL_ID=107, 
November 4, 2003, (accessed October 24, 2010). 
16 International Energy Agency, Press Release.	  
17 International Energy Agency, “World Energy Outlook 2009,” http://www.iea.org/weo/2009.asp, 2009, pp. 42-43, 








to 30%. Oil demand (excluding biofuels) is projected to grow by 1% per year on average 
over the projection period, from 85 million barrels per day in 2008 to 105 mb/d in 2030. 
All the growth comes from non-OECD countries: OECD demand actually falls. The 
transport sector accounts for 97% of the increase in oil use. As conventional oil 
production in countries not belonging to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) peaks around 2010, most of the increase in output would need to come 
from OPEC countries, which hold the bulk of remaining recoverable conventional oil 
resources. 
 
The main driver of demand for coal and gas is the inexorable growth in energy needs for 
power generation. World electricity demand is projected to grow at an annual rate of 
2.5% to 2030. Over 80% of the growth takes place in non-OECD countries. Globally, 
additions to power-generation capacity total 4,800 gigawatts (GW) by 2030 — almost 
five times the existing capacity of the United States. The largest additions (around 28% 
of the total) occur in China. Coal remains the backbone fuel of the power sector, its share 
of the global generation mix rising by three percentage points to 44% in 2030. Nuclear 
power output grows in all major regions bar Europe, but its share in total generation falls. 
 
The use of non-hydro modern renewable energy technologies (including wind, solar, 
geothermal, tide and wave energy, and bio-energy) sees the fastest rate of increase in the 
Reference Scenario. Most of the increase is in power generation: the share of non-hydro 
renewables in total power output rises from 2.5% in 2007 to 8.6% in 2030, with wind 
power seeing the biggest absolute increase. The consumption of biofuels for transport 
also rises strongly. The share of hydropower, by contrast, drops from 16% to 14%. 
 
Another downside to the 2007 financial crisis is the hiring slowdown for engineering and science 
graduates.  Per the NPC report “Hard Truths,” a majority of the U.S. energy sector workforce, 
including skilled scientists, is eligible to retire in the next decade.18  The boom and bust cycle of 
the energy industry coupled with the recent BP Gulf of Mexico disaster have caused bright 
young professionals to spurn the energy industry.  The speculation has been that the brightest 
students have opted for careers in the financial industry versus a career as an engineer.    
                                                
 
18 National Petroleum Council Presentation, “Facing the Hard Truths about Energy,” 
http://www.npchardtruthsreport.org/, 2007, p. 31, (accessed October 1, 2010). 
  
13 
The U.S. DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) noted the following in 
a research announcement to encourage students to enroll in CS-STEM (Computer Science – 
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields.19 
The United States has entered into a significant national decline in the number of college 
graduates with STEM degrees. This downward trend is an issue of national importance as 
it affects our capacity to maintain a technological lead in critical skills and disciplines 
related to CS-STEM. Our ability to compete in the increasingly internationalized stage 
will be hindered without college graduates with the ability to understand and innovate 
cutting edge technologies in the decades to come.  
 
The downward trend in college graduates with STEM majors is particularly pronounced 
in Computer Science (CS). While computers and Internet connectivity become daily 
fixtures in the lives of Americans, we are steadily losing the engineering talent to project 
these systems. According to the Computer Research Association, there were 43% fewer 
graduates and 45% fewer CS degree enrollments in 2006/2007 than in 2003/2004. 
 
The decrease in CS degree enrollment is likely attributed to two things.  First, the dot-
com bubble enticed students to enroll in the computer science field.  When the bubble burst, the 
abundance of jobs and opportunities appeared to disappear overnight.  Secondly, globalization of 
IT (Information Technology) work has eliminated many U.S. jobs where students graduating 
with CS degrees have difficulty finding jobs.  Further complicating the job economic plight of 
graduates is the impact of the 2007 Financial Crisis where hiring of recent graduates in virtually 
all technical fields has ground to a halt as companies slow plans for expansions and new projects.  
The energy industry has seen numerous episodes of wild price swings, which mimic the impact 
of the 2007 financial crisis.  At the peak of the energy price bubble, the industry is faced with a 
shortage of new and experienced talent, which bids up salaries.  Inevitably as the bubble crashes,   
                                                
 
19 Defense Advances Research Products Agency, “DARPA-RA-10-03 Computer Science – Science, Technology, 
Engineering, and Mathematics (CS-STEM) Education Research Announcement,” 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=88b3ebc24fb6377fac6b1107d8d96b84&_cvi






layoffs result and recent college graduates hoping to find jobs in the energy sector are left to find 
careers elsewhere. 
 
Emerging Market Energy Growth 
Throughout the financial crisis, the emerging markets of Brazil, China, and India have 
fallen less and have recovered faster than OECD countries.  China, India, and Brazil will be three 
of the largest emerging economies to impact the global supply of oil.20  Figure 4 depicts the trend 
 in Chinese oil consumption, which points to an economy that is acquiring a voracious appetite 
for oil.   
 
Figure 4. Chinese Oil Demand21 
 
                                                
 
20 Alexander Smith, “Oil is Spiking – Are you positioned?” Seeking Alpha, http://seekingalpha.com/article/228660-
oil-is-spiking-are-you-positioned?source=feed, October 6, 2010,  (accessed October 31, 2010). 
21 Alexander Smith, “Oil is Spiking – Are you positioned?” Seeking Alpha, http://seekingalpha.com/article/228660-
oil-is-spik17ing-are-you-positioned?source=feed, October 6, 2010, (accessed October 31, 2010). 
  
15 
As an individual country, China is the number one exporter in the world.  Recently it 
overtook Japan as the world’s number two economy behind the U.S.  Another milestone that 
China has achieved is that it is now the world’s largest manufacturer of automobiles.22  
Speculation is ongoing as to when China will overtake the U.S. as the world’s number one 
economy in addition to becoming the world’s number one consumer of oil.  Currently China is 
the third largest importer of oil while 15 years ago it was a net exporter.  In terms of 
consumption, China is the second largest consumer of oil in the world second only to the U.S.23 
Various projections exist for world oil demand.  Dargay and Gately have authored a 
paper that projects world energy demand to be 20% higher than the U.S. Department of Energy, 
International Energy Association (IEA), and OPEC estimates.24  In their analysis of world oil 
demand, Dargay and Gately predict that world per capita oil demand will grow to 1.8 liters/day 
by 2030, which is in contrast to the 2009 IEA and OPEC projects of 1.2 liters/day.  The 1.8 
liter/day consumption rate is based on a historical rest-of-world growth rate.  This higher 
projection figure amounts to an extra 20 million barrels of oil per day in demand, which is 
roughly twice the current production of Saudi Arabia.25 
India is also a major contributor to increases in world energy demand.  Rapid growth 
and industrialization have created a peak hour electricity shortage of 14% that has firms 
scrambling to expand generation and transmission capacity to handle urbanization and   
                                                
 
22 World Bank, “The Recovery,” 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPHALFYEARLYUPDATE/Resources/550192-
1270538603148/eap_april2010_ch1.pdf, April 2010, p. 3, (accessed October 31, 2010). 
23 Alexander Smith, “Oil is Spiking – Are you positioned?” Seeking Alpha.	  
24 Joyce M. Darday, Dermot Gately, “World oil demand’s shift toward faster growing and less price-responsive 
products and regions,” www.econ.nyu.edu/user/nyarkoy/OilDemand_DargayGately_Feb2010.pdf, 2010, p. 1, 
(accessed November 3, 2010). 
25 Joyce M. Darday, Dermot Gately, “World oil demand’s shift toward faster growing and less price-responsive 






industrialization.26 It was previously mentioned that in the last 15 years China went from a net 
exporter of petroleum to a net importer.  A similar situation has occurred in the coal markets.  
Both India and China lay claim to the world’s third and fifth largest coal reserves, respectively. 
However, their consumption is running faster than they can develop mines.  In the last five years, 
China has gone from a major exporter of coal to a net importer.27 
The Council on Foreign relations recently published an article titled “China Will Force 
the World Off Oil.”  The argument made in the article describes the energy peril facing the world 
as countries such as China raises the income level of their poor (Figure 5). 
As a country’s per capita income increases, its per capita oil consumption increases. 
Consumption growth tends to be modest up until $15,000 income per head, but then 
accelerates rapidly. China is quickly approaching this point. South Korea, which 
consumes 3% of world oil output, is too small to disrupt oil markets.  China is too big not 
to disrupt them.  Were China’s per capita oil consumption to be brought up to South 
Korea’s, its share of global consumption would increase from today’s 10% to over 
70%.  In order to cap China’s share at 22%, which is the U.S. share today, global oil 
output would have to increase by a massive 13% per annum over ten years – well beyond 
the 1% growth averaged since 1975.  This rate of growth is inconceivable, even if vastly 
more expensive sources of supply, such as the Canadian oil sands, were developed at 
breakneck speed.  If China’s recent economic growth pace continues, it will surpass 
South Korea’s current per capita GDP shortly after 2020 – meaning that the world may 
be forced onto alternative energy sources much sooner than it realizes. 28 
  
                                                
 
26 World Market Pulse, “Huge Indian Demand to drive Global Coal Export Boom,” 
http://worldmarketpulse.com/Investing/Exchange-Traded-Funds/Industry-Sector-ETF/Energy-ETF/Huge-Indian-
Demand-to-Drive-Global-Coal-Export-Boom.html, October 1, 2010, (accessed October 29, 2010). 
27 Antony Froggatt and Glada Lahn , Lloyds 360o Risk Insight, “Sustainable Energy Security,” 
http://www.lloyds.com/News-and-Insight/360-Risk-Insight/Research-and-Reports/Energy-Security/Energy-Security, 
, 2010, p. 11 (accessed October 1, 2010).	  
28 Council on Foreign Relations, “China Will Force the World Off Oil,” 









Figure 5. Per Capita Oil Consumption and Wealth29  
                                                
 
29 Council on Foreign Relations, “China Will Force the World Off Oil,” 






Per the International Energy Agency, China has now overtaken the U.S. as the world’s 
number one energy consumer. 
IEA calculations based on preliminary data show that China has now overtaken the 
United States to become the world's largest energy user. China's rise to the top ranking 
was faster than expected as it was much less affected by the global financial crisis than 
the United States.   
     
For those who have been following energy consumption trends closely, this does not 
come as a surprise. What is more important is the phenomenal growth in demand that has 
taken place in China over the last decade; also prospects for future growth still remain 
incredibly strong. Since 2000, China’s energy demand has doubled, yet on a per capita 
basis it is still only around one-third of the OECD average. Prospects for further growth 
are very strong considering the country’s low per-capita consumption level and the fact 




Increases in Greenhouse Gases Due to New Electrical Generation 
As mentioned previously, coal is priced as a relatively cheap fuel sans a carbon tax and 
accounting for global warming externalities.  Cheap coal is 17.5% the cost of natural gas and 
2.0% the cost of oil on an equivalent energy basis ($/mmbtu).  Hence, coal is a source of cheap 
fuel, making it a logical choice for emerging economies to use for electrical generation.  In India, 
coal powers 75% of the electrical plants.  Imports of coal to India are expected to rise to 100 
million metric tons in 2011/2012 from an estimated current usage of 80 million metric tons 
presently.  China has become a net coal importer, which now accounts for nearly half of all   
                                                
 
30 International Energy Agency, “China overtakes the United States to become the world’s largest energy 
consumer,” http://www.iea.org/index_info.asp?id=1479, July 20, 2010, (accessed November 5, 2010).	  
  
19 
global coal demand.31  The rapid growth in coal consumption for India and China will cause a 
commensurate increase in GHG.  Based on the articles reviewed for this thesis, there has been no 
mention of any CO2 capture or sequestration for facilities under construction or proposed for 
either country.  Although China has been mentioned as having plans to install significant 
renewable energy sources (primarily wind), there is usually an equal capacity of backup power 
installed in the form of coal-fired plants. 
 
Infrastructure Impact on U.S. Energy Policy 
A recent push has occurred in the U.S. to make electric vehicles a significant part of the 
transportation sector.  However, the electrical infrastructure in the U.S. is in need of investment 
and lacks the ability to efficiently produce and distribute electricity to power electric vehicles. 
America operates a fleet of approximately 10,000 power plants. The average thermal 
efficiency of a power plant is roughly 33%. Efficiency has not changed much since 1960 because 
of slow turnover of the capital stock and the inherent inefficiency of central power generation 
that cannot recycle heat. Power plants are generally long-lived investments; the majority of the 
existing capacity is 30 or more years old.32  The U.S. power grid was estimated to experience 
6.5% in losses in 2007 which further diminishes efficiency.33  This results in a 26.5% overall 
energy efficiency by the time power gets to the desired location.  
  
                                                
 
31 World Market Pulse, “Huge Indian Demand to drive Global Coal Export Boom,” 
http://worldmarketpulse.com/Investing/Exchange-Traded-Funds/Industry-Sector-ETF/Energy-ETF/Huge-Indian-
Demand-to-Drive-Global-Coal-Export-Boom.html, October 1, 2010, (accessed October 29, 2010). 
32 U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability Gridworks, “Overview of the 
Electrical Grid,” http://sites.energetics.com/gridworks/grid.html, 2007, (accessed April 12, 2010). 
33 Wikipedia, “Electric Power Transmission,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_power_transmission, (accessed 






From a holistic standpoint, the ability to offer affordable, efficient, green transportation 
to the masses has shortcomings that will need to be addressed to make electric cars a viable 
option for the average commuter.  Similar efforts have been put forth for railroads where the 
industry has been encouraged to embrace electric power in place of diesel fuel.  In Europe, 
electrification of freight rail has occurred only to drive up freight transportation prices forcing 
shippers to move their cargo via truck versus rail. 
 
U.S. Coal and Natural Gas Reserves 
As of January 1, 2009, the recoverable reserves (Figure 6) at producing coalmines were 
17.9 billion short tons (one short ton is 2,000 pounds).34 
In addition to coal resources, the U.S. also has a large amount of conventional and 
unconventional natural gas reserves (Figure 7) that are being explored in light of current pricing, 
new directional drilling, and hydro-fracturing techniques.   
As of December 31, 2007, estimated proved reserves of "dry natural gas" (consumer-
grade natural gas) in the United States were 237.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). The United States 
consumed 23.2 Tcf of natural gas in 2007.  
Record-high additions to U.S. dry natural gas proved reserves35 in 2007 totaled 46.1 Tcf. 
The dry natural gas reserve additions mostly reflected the rapid development of unconventional  
                                                
 
34 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis, “Coal Explained – How Much Coal 
is Left,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=coal_reserves, 2009, (accessed October 31, 
2010). 
35 Proven reserves are such estimated quantities of mineral deposits, at a specific date, as analysis of geologic 
engineering data demonstrates with reasonable certainty to be recoverable in the future under the same economic 
and operational conditions, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2187, last revised December 2, 2005, 




Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-7A, Coal Production Report (February 2009) 
 
Figure 6. U.S. Coal Resources and Reserves 
gas resources including shale, coalbed methane, and tight, low-permeability formations. Many of 
these unconventional resources are cost effective to develop because of advances in drilling 
technologies and in techniques to increase gas yields from these formations and because of 
increases in market prices for natural gas.36  
As of January 1, 2008, the U.S. had technically recoverable natural gas reserves37 of 
2,118.7 trillion cubic feet.38 
                                                
 
36 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Independent Statistics and Analysis, “Natural Gas Explained – How 
Much Gas Is Left,” http://www.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=natural_gas_reserves, 2010, (accessed 
November 7, 2010). 
37 Technically resources, implies that the technology exists (or is foreseeable in the near future) to get economically 
unrecoverable resources from the ground, but the economics do not exist to make the production of this natural gas 
profitable, http://www.naturalgas.org/overview/ng_resource_base.asp, (accessed December 12, 2010). 
38 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Oil and Gas Supply Module,” 
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U.S. Energy Sector Breakdown 
Energy is a key component in the manufacture and distribution of all economic goods.  
As a percent of GDP, energy was declining until 1999, which saw a trend reversal (see Figure 8).  
A gradually weakening dollar also raises the country’s energy bill. The U.S. balance of payments 
has averaged a deficit for goods of over $500 billion per year since 2003.  Based on EIA weekly 
petroleum import data,39 the U.S. imports roughly 13,000,000 barrels per day of oil and 
petroleum products.   
 
 
Figure 8. Energy Expenditures as a Share of U.S. GDP 1970-2007  
Source: EIA 2009 Energy Summary  
                                                
 
39U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Weekly Imports and Exports,” 









Assuming an approximate cost of $85 per barrel, the cost of oil and petroleum imports 
totals roughly $403 billion dollars per year. 
 
Transportation Fuels 
The U.S. transportation sector continued to show significant growth until the 2007 
economic meltdown.  As manufacturing in the U.S. continues to decline, the transportation 
sector is now poised to become the largest consuming energy sector in the U.S.  Until 2007, 
transportation also had the fastest growth rate of the four energy use sectors (see Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9. U.S. Sector Energy Consumption 




Transportation fuel currently accounts for only 0.15% of total U.S. demand for natural 
gas40 and is the largest consuming sector of petroleum in the U.S.  (27,033 trillion btus in 2009).  
13.3 million barrels/day, or 71% of all petroleum used in 2009, was consumed by the U.S. 
Transportation sector.  The MIT Study on the Future of Natural Gas notes: 
 Use of CNG as a vehicular fuel is well established and growing worldwide. 
Increased use of natural gas to provide a vehicular fuel in the U.S., either directly 
or perhaps indirectly by conversion into a liquid fuel, could be driven by lower 
prices for natural gas relative to oil and by policies aimed at reducing oil 
dependence and GHG emissions. CNG use reduces GHG emissions by around 
25% relative to gasoline.41 
 
The EIA has projected natural gas to maintain its cost advantage over diesel fuel making 
it an attractive transportation fuel alternative.  In the transportation of freight, LNG (Liquefied 
Natural gas) has the potential to fuel heavy-duty trucks in place of diesel fuel.  Trucking markets 
in the U.S. consume an estimated 17 billion gallons per year of diesel fuel.42   
Other large fuel users in the U.S. are the shipping and railroad markets.  These markets 
represent potential markets for LNG as a transportation fuel.  The rail market in the U.S. is a 4 
billion gallon per year consumer of diesel fuel.  The rail industry began experimenting with LNG 
in 1995 as a means to reduce emissions.  Rail LNG technology did not prove reliable and cost 
effective. However, recent natural gas prices of $3.40/mmbtu equate to $0.442/dge (diesel gallon  
  
                                                
 
40 MIT, “The Future of Natural Gas,” http://web.mit.edu/mitei/research/studies/report-natural-gas.pdf, 2010, p. 50, 
(accessed November 6, 2010). 
41 MIT, “The Future of Natural Gas,” http://web.mit.edu/mitei/research/studies/report-natural-gas.pdf, 2010, p. 50, 
(accessed November 6, 2010). 
42 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2010,” 






equivalent).  This compares to an average diesel price of roughly $3/gallon.43  The current cost 
difference between LNG and diesel yields a margin of $2.558/gallon, which serves as an 
incentive to switch from diesel fuel to LNG.  As shown in Figure 10, the cost margin between 
diesel and natural gas is likely to be maintained throughout the foreseeable future.   
However, significant hurdles exist in terms of refueling infrastructure and improvements 
in LNG engine technology.  LNG as a fuel is best suited to high horsepower fleet vehicles with a  
 
 
Figure 10. EIA Projected Diesel Natural Gas Cost Differential 
Source: EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2010 
  
                                                
 
43 U.S. Energy Information Administration, ”Weekly Fuel Prices,” 
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regular turnover of fuel.  Regular fuel turnover is needed to prevent the LNG in liquid form from 
vaporizing.  At normal temperatures and pressures, LNG would be in the gaseous state.  
However, LNG is refrigerated to roughly -270oF and roughly 5 psig (pounds per square inch 
gauge pressure) where it is a liquid.  Warming of the LNG is minimized by the use of insulation 
in fuel storage where a well-designed system is capable of minimizing liquid boil-off.  
CNG (Compressed Natural Gas) is another potential transportation fuel.  As shown in 
Table 3, many countries have significant numbers of CNG vehicles due to the high cost of other 
transportation fuels.  
 
Table 3.  Natural Gas Vehicles Worldwide44 
 Locations  Approximate Number of CNG Vehicles 
Pakistan 2,300,000 
Argentina 1,807,186 
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One of the biggest impediments to CNG use in the U.S. has been the development of 
refueling infrastructure.  It is difficult if not impossible to travel portions of the U.S. Interstate 
system with a CNG vehicle due to the lack of refueling stations.  CNG is compressed to 3,600 
psig for light duty vehicle use.  The high pressure gas is stored in specially designed gas 
cylinders on the vehicle.  Due to the size of the storage cylinders and relatively low energy 











In terms of carbon footprint, natural gas has the smallest carbon footprint of all fossil 
fuels.  As noted previously, coal has a considerable cost advantage over natural gas but has the 
worst carbon footprint of the hydrocarbon fuels.  Although India and China plan to expand their 
electricity generation with coal-fired plants, there is an opportunity in the U.S. to displace the use 
of coal in electrical generation.  Table 4 depicts on a common basis, the cost of a kw-hr of 
electricity for different sources based on 2005 costs. 
 
Table 4.  Levelized Cost of Electricity (2005 $/kw-hr)45 
Energy Source Reference Sensitivity 
Coal 5.4  
Advanced Natural Gas (NGCC) 5.6  
Advanced Nuclear 8.8 7.3 
Coal/Gas with CCS 9.2/8.5 6.9/6.6 
Renewables   
Wind 6.0  
Biomass 8.5  
Solar 19.3  
Substitution elasticity 
(Wind, Biomass, Solar) 
1.0  
Wind + Gas Backup 10.0  
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One of the goals of this thesis is to determine how speculation may be driving prices in 
the energy markets.   
Supply and demand ultimately determines the price of a commodity but recently, the 
impact of speculation has been singled out as an important factor in the determination of market 
pricing.  Speculation was pointed to as a possible factor in the run-up of crude to $145 per barrel. 
Commodity speculation is also being pointed to as a contributor to increases in food prices as 
shown in Figure 11.   
The Institute for Agriculture and Food Policy released a report that cited commodity 
speculation as a contributor to food price volatility and a risk to developing countries’ stability 
(see Figure 11).   Rapidly escalating commodity food prices will seriously impact the poor in 






Figure 11. Food and Agriculture Association Cereal Price Index46 
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Trading in the energy markets has been analyzed by a number of researchers with the 
results being inconclusive.  However, Dale and Zyren performed an analysis of the energy 
markets that concluded that noncommercial traders are likely to switch between markets and add 
to “hot money” flows.47  The hypothesis put forth by Dale and Zygren was “do large 
noncommercial traders tend to concentrate in a single market or do they shift large sums between 
different markets at the first sign of a possible higher rate of return?”48 
Daily data were collected from a number of sources and then summarized in a weekly 
format for analysis using STATA and various ARIMA (Auto Regressive Integrated Moving 
Average) and VAR (Vector Auto Regression) time series models. 
The following definitions are for the various futures contracts downloaded and analyzed 
from the CFTC weekly historical reports.49  The U.S. natural gas markets were selected for 
investigation due to the lack of influence from gas supplies outside the U.S.  Unlike crude 
markets, the natural gas supply to the U.S. is predominantly from domestic sources and Canada.  
One of the goals of the econometric analysis was to determine the impact of “hot money” on 
commodity prices.  
                                                
 
47 Charles Dale, John Zygren, “Noncommercial Trading in the Energy Futures Market,” Energy Information 
Administration, Petroleum Marketing Monthly (May1996), p. xiii. 
48 Charles Dale, John Zygren, “Noncommercial Trading in the Energy Futures Market,” p. 18. 
49 U.S. Commodity Trading Futures Commission, Historical Reports, 





Commercials are associated with an underlying cash-related business. They are 
commonly considered to be hedgers.  Commercials normally own or anticipate owning the 
physical product and may use the markets for “hedging” to take an offsetting position in the 
futures market in an attempt to lock in a cost or profit margin.51 
 
Noncommercial Traders52 
Noncommercials are not involved in an underlying cash business; thus, they are referred 
to as speculators.  Furthermore, reporting level noncommercial activity is generally considered to 
be that of managed futures or commodity funds. (Commodity pools and hedge funds) 
 
Futures Open Interest 
Futures Open Interest is the total number of contracts outstanding, which includes all 
long, short, and spreading contracts. 
 
Futures Commercial Short Contracts 
Futures Commercial Short Contracts are contracts to “sell” the underlying commodity at 
a future date. 
 
                                                
 
50 Dwight R. Sanders, Keith Boris, Mark Manfred, “Hedgers, funds, and small speculators in the energy futures 
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2004), p. 426. 
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Futures Noncommercial Short Contracts 
Noncommercial Short Contracts are futures contracts to “sell” the underlying 
commodity at a future date. 
 
Futures Commercial Long Contracts 
Futures Commercial Long Contracts are futures contracts to purchase the underlying 
commodity at a future date. 
 
Futures Noncommercial Long Contracts 
Noncommercial Long Contracts are futures contracts to purchase the underlying 
commodity at a future date. 
Table 5 summarizes the key variables in the econometric analysis. 








real_gas_price Real natural gas price in 
2010 dollars 
5.499106 2.749613 2.077087    17.06117 
futures_open_interest Natural gas futures contracts 
open interest. 
447396.6   254039.3 110254      971774 
ln_real_ng_price Natural log of real natural 
gas prices 
1.590061 .474485 .7309664    2.836805 
ln_open_interest Natural log of futures 
contract open interest 
12.83409   .617185   11.61054    13.78688 
futures_com_short Natural gas futures 
commercial short contracts 
238825.6 97523.88 83355      477839 
futures_non_short Natural gas futures 
noncommercial  
short contracts 
72613.33 89716.68 915      396198 
futures_com_long Natural gas futures 
commercial long contracts 
240918.1 106063.1   72102      458476 
futures_non_long Natural gas futures 
noncommercial 
long contracts 






TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 
 
ARIMA (Autoregression Integrated Moving Average), ARCH (Autoregression Constant 
Heteroskedasticity), and VAR (Vector Autoregression) models offer different techniques for 
analyzing the natural gas data.  Of the three methods of time series analysis, the VAR is superior 
due to the nonstationarity and heteroskedasticity in the natural gas data. 
There were six VAR models analyzed using STATA 10 software that were of particular 
interest: 
1. Natural Gas Prices and Commercial Futures Open Interest (Figure 12) 
2. Log Natural Gas Prices and Log of Futures Open Interest (Figure 13) 
3. Natural Gas Prices and Commercial Futures Short Contracts (Figure 14) 
4. Natural Gas Prices and Noncommercial Futures Short Contracts (Figure 15) 
5. Natural Gas Prices and Commercial Futures Contracts (Figure 16) 









Figure 12. Natural Gas Prices and Commercial Futures Open Interest 
MODEL 1. Stata command: var  real_gas_price futures_open_interest 
real_gas_pricet = 1.20279 real_gas_price t-1 - 0.2248819 real_gas_price t-2  
   +2.24e-06 futures_open_interest t-1 - 2.14e-06 futures_open_interest t-2 
   + 0.0710576 
futures_open_interestt =  1.150931 futures_open_interest t-1  
                                             - 0.1529734 futures_open_interest t-2 + 931.6411 
 
All coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level with the exception of the 
coefficients for real_gas_price t-1 and real_gas_price t-2 in the second vector equation. 
 
Granger causation testing determined that futures open interest Granger-causes real 
natural gas prices.  This result implies that as increasing contracts (open interest) in the futures 







Figure 13. Log Natural Gas Prices and Log of Futures Open Interest 
MODEL 2. Stata command: var ln_real_ng_price  ln_open_interest 
ln_real_ng_pricet = 1.126571 ln_real_ng_pricet-1 - 0.1471069 ln_real_ng_pricet-2  
    + 0.1478069 ln_open_interestt-1 - 0.1380233 ln_open_interestt-2 
-­‐ 0.093164 
ln_real_ng_pricet = 0.034977 ln_real_ng_pricet-1 -0.0347661 ln_real_ng_pricet-2  
        + 1.06969 ln_open_interestt-1 -0.0722524 ln_open_interestt-2 
      + 0.0345122 
 
All coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level. 
 
Granger causation testing determined that changes in futures open interest Granger-
causes changes in real natural gas prices.  This result implies that changes in futures contracts 










Figure 14. Natural Gas Prices and Commercial Futures Short Contracts 
MODEL 3. Stata command: var  real_gas_price  futures_com_short 
real_gas_pricet = 1.200636 real_gas_price t-1 - 0.2225302 real_gas_price t-2  
   +  0 .0398491 
futures_com_shortt = 3349.771 real_gas_price t-1 - 3475.84 real_gas_price t-2  
   + 1.158688 futures_com_short t-1 - 0.163795 futures_com_short t-2 
   + 2023.924 
 
All coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level with the exception of the 
coefficients for futures_com_short t-1 and futures_com_short t-2 in the first vector equation. 
 
Granger causation testing determined that real natural gas prices Granger-causes futures 
commercial short positions. This result implies that real natural gas prices drive short 






Figure 15. Natural Gas Prices and Noncommercial Futures Short Contracts 
MODEL 4. Stata command: var  real_gas_price  futures_non_short 
real_gas_pricet = 1.210243 real_gas_price t-1 - 0.2273802real_gas_price t-2  
   + 0.0908204 
futures_non_shortt = -1881.614 real_gas_price t-1 + 2093.16 real_gas_price t-2  
   + 1.273068 futures_non_short t-1 - 0.277184 futures_non_short t-2 
-­‐ 635.4323 
 
All coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level with the exception of the 
coefficients for futures_non_short t-1 and futures_non_short t-2 in the first vector equation. 
 
Granger causation testing determined that real natural gas prices Granger-causes futures 
noncommercial short positions. This result implies that natural gas prices in real terms drive 









Figure 16. Natural Gas Prices and Commercial Futures Contracts 
MODEL 5. Stata command: var  real_gas_price   futures_com_long 
real_gas_pricet = 1.20581 real_gas_price t-1 - 0.2259098 real_gas_price t-2  
   + 0.055533 
futures_com_longt = -1743.704 real_gas_price t-1 +1840.089 real_gas_price t-2  
   + 1.099782 futures_com_long t-1 - 0.1054234 futures_com_long t-2 
   + 1110.08 
 
All coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level with the exception of the 
coefficients for futures_com_long t-1 and futures_com_long t-2 in the first vector equation. 
 
Granger causation testing determined that real natural gas prices Granger-causes futures 
commercial long positions. This result implies that natural gas prices in real terms drive futures 







Figure 17. Natural Gas Prices and Noncommercial Long Futures Contracts 
MODEL 6. Stata command: var  real_gas_price   futures_non_long 
real_gas_pricet = 1.204946 real_gas_price t-1 - 0.2248425 real_gas_price t-2  
   + 2.59e-07 futures_non_long t-1 + 1.59e-07 futures_non_long t-2 
   + 0 .0904125 
futures_non_longt = 2153.853 real_gas_price t-1 - 2059.336 real_gas_price t-2  
   + 1.19518futures_non_long t-1 - 0.2084536 futures_non_long t-2 
   + 175.5243 
 
All coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level with the exception of the 
coefficients for futures_non_long t-1 and futures_non_long t-2 in the first vector equation. 
 
Granger causation testing determined that real natural gas prices Granger-causes futures 
noncommercial long positions. This result implies that natural gas prices in real terms drive 











The econometric analysis determined that there is an influence of futures contracts on 
natural gas prices in real and nominal terms.   
 
• Futures open interest Granger-causes natural gas prices (in both real and nominal 
terms). 
• Changes in open interest Granger-causes changes in natural gas prices (in both real 
and nominal terms). 
• Real natural gas prices Granger-causes futures commercial short positions. 
• Real natural gas prices Granger-causes futures noncommercial short positions. 
• Real natural gas prices Granger-causes futures commercial long positions. 
• Real natural gas prices Granger-causes futures noncommercial long positions. 
 
Speculation in the form of futures open interest is driving prices in the natural gas 
markets.  Furthermore, prices are attracting commercial and noncommercial participants to the 





ECONOMETRIC SUMMARY OF ACADEMIC PAPERS 
 
The following summarizes academic papers that have evaluated the impact of 
speculation on futures markets. 
 
Noncommercial Trading in the Energy Futures Markets  
by Charles Dale and John Zyren 
The general model used for the investigation 
 ΔCt = f(ΔPt, ΔPwti, ΔPtb, ΔCNj) 
where: 
Ct represents the number of contracts (long or short) of noncommercial traders. 
Pt is the “nearby,” i.e., next expiring futures contract price. 
Pwti is the nearby crude oil futures contract price. 
Ptb is the nearby Treasury bond futures contract price. 
CNj represents the net positions of related futures contracts.53  
 
Summary Results 
First, there were statistically significant positive coefficients for every “nearby,” i.e., 
next expiring, futures contract price in the regression for the number of long holdings for that   
                                                
 
53 Charles Dale, John Zyren, “Noncommercial Trading in the Energy Futures Market,” Energy Information 






contract, e.g., a price increase of crude oil led to an increase in long crude oil contract holdings.  
Similarly, there were statistically significant negative coefficients for prices that correspond to 
short holdings, e.g., a price increase of crude oil led to a decrease in short crude oil contract 
holdings.  These results mean that in the same weekly period, a price rise in nearby futures 
contracts is associated with a purchase of additional long contracts and a selling of short 
contracts.  This contemporaneous correlation strongly suggests that energy traders follow price 
trends, they do not set them.  They buy on price rallies and sell into price dips.54 
Markets for Crude Oil, Gasoline, Heating Oil, and Treasury Bonds were analyzed.  
Natural gas markets in the time period of the data (October 6, 1992 through June 27, 1995) were 
NOT analyzed. 
 
Devil or Angel?  The Role of Speculation in the Recent Commodity 
Price Boom (and Bust) by Scott H. Irwin, Dwight R. Sanders, 
and Robert P. Merrin 
Standard Granger causality tests between futures price changes and position changes in 
commodity futures markets were carried out.  These tests establish whether lagged position 
changes help to forecast current futures price changes.55  
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A statistically significant relationship between the movement of commodity futures 
prices and measures of position change is found in only 5 out of 30 cases. 
Wheat, corn, soybeans, hogs, and cattle markets were empirically analyzed. Energy 
markets were NOT analyzed. 
 
Hedgers, Funds, and Small Speculators in the Energy Futures Markets:  
an Analysis of the CFTC/s Commitments of Traders Reports  
by Dwight R. Sanders, Keith Boris, and Mark Manfredo 
 There were three models that were used to analyze the data. 
 PNLt = φ + Σ λiPNLt-1 + Σ θjRt-j + ωt – Do returns lead traders’ positions? 
 Rt = α + Σ γiRt-1 + Σ βjPNLt-j + εt – Do traders’ positions lead returns? 
 Rt = α0 + α1LOt-1 + α2HIt-1 + εt  - Impact of extreme trader positions 
 
where: 
PNL is defines as present net long positions (Long – Short)/(Long + Short) 
R is defines as market returns 
LO is defined as a variable where LO=1 if PNL is in the lower 20th percentile of 
its range from the prior 3 years, and LO=0 otherwise. 
HI is defined as a variable where HI=1 if PNL is in the upper 20th percentile of its 








The results indicate that reporting noncommercials increase their long positions in rising 
markets, and commercials decrease their positions in rising markets.  Positive futures returns 
Granger cause increases in the net long positions held by reporting noncommercial traders, 
whereas commercials are net sellers following price increases.  Commercials are net sellers the 
week following an increase in prices, and noncommercials are net buyers.56 
The time period analyzed was from October 1992 to December 1999.  Energy markets 
for Crude Oil, Gasoline, Heating Oil, and Natural Gas were analyzed. 
 
A Speculative Bubble in Commodity Futures Prices?  Cross-Sectional Evidence  
by Dwight R. Sanders, Scott H. Irwin, and Robert P. Merrin 
There were three models that were used to analyze the data. 
 Ri,t+1 = α + βPositionsi,t + et  
 Ri,t+1 = α + βPositionsi,t + ΘRt + et 
where: 
Positionsi,t is defines as an index fund position at time t 
R is defines as market returns  
                                                
 
56 Dwight R. Sanders, Scott H. Irwin, Robert P. Merrin, “Devil or Angel?  The Role of Speculation in the Recent 





The evidence that index fund positions impact returns across markets is scant.  Similarly, 
the vast majority of empirical evidence presented by academic researchers fails to find any 
relationship between positions held by large traders and subsequent price behavior.57 
Twelve agricultural futures markets were analyzed based on data from the CIT 
(Commodity Index Traders) report from the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) 
from January 3, 2006 through December 30, 2008.  The markets in the analysis were: corn, 
soybeans, soybean oil, COBT (Chicago Board of Trade) wheat, KCBOT (Kansas City Board of 
Trade) wheat, cotton, live cattle, feeder cattle, lean hogs, coffee, sugar, and cocoa.  
                                                
 
57 Dwight R. Sanders, Scott H. Irwin, Robert P. Merrin, “A Speculative Bubble in Commodity Futures Prices?  
Cross-Sectional Evidence,” (Paper presented at the NCCC-134 Conference on Applied Commodity Price Analysis, 










As noted in the thesis, world energy surpluses are dwindling, and the demand 
projections for emerging markets are projected to overwhelm Middle East supplies by as early as 
2015.  The 2007 economic crisis has pushed back investment in energy projects where a low-
growth scenario in world GDP could create drastic price increases in world energy prices.  
Without a long-term energy supply plan, the U.S. is destined to see growth reduced and its trade 
imbalances continue to deteriorate with increasing energy costs. 
Based on the economic models presented in this paper, speculation adds to price 
movements in the energy markets, which in the short term could cause violent swings in energy 
prices. 
Recent improvements in the production of unconventional natural gas supplies have 
increased the country’s reserves where opportunities exist to reduce the dependence on foreign 
petroleum supplies.  The primary areas where natural gas could make a contribution to U.S. 
energy imbalance would be in electricity generation and transportation fuels.  India and China 
have committed to increases in electrical production via coal, which could lead to the export of 
U.S. coal to those markets.  The void left in U.S. electricity production could easily be met by 
natural gas.  In addition to the electrical market, natural gas as a transportation fuel could also 
stabilize U.S. energy supplies if trucking, shipping, and rail were to embrace natural gas.  The 
U.S. government, in particular the U.S. military, could have a major impact on domestic energy 




One in five barrels of U.S. oil is derived from a country that the State Department views 
to be "dangerous or unstable" (see Figure 18). The cost of this oil is volatile and can be cut off at 
any time,58 which would pose a serious economic shock to the U.S. In 2008 the ten countries that 
the U.S. imported oil from and considered unstable were Columbia, Mauritania, Algeria, Syria, 
Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, and Nigeria.59 
Without a comprehensive energy policy, the U.S. is dependent on energy free markets to 
supply its needs.  As this paper pointed out, the future energy markets are likely to see greater 
volatility and increased completion by developing countries such as China and India.  In contrast 
to the free market approach taken in the U.S., Chinese oil companies have chosen to pursue 
reserves on numerous continents.   China is in the midst of an internal debate, which involves its 
military, over how to ensure the county’s oil needs are met without undermining national 
security.60   
Now that the supply surpluses in the energy markets have disappeared, there could be 
wild swings ahead in the energy markets that will undermine recovery from the 2007 financial 
crisis as well as compromise future economic growth. The U.S. is at risk for its national security 
and economic future if it does not establish a comprehensive energy policy. 
  
                                                
 
58 Alexander Smith, “Oil is Spiking – Are you positioned?” Seeking Alpha, http://seekingalpha.com/article/228660-
oil-is-spiking-are-you-positioned?source=feed, (accessed October 31, 2010). 
59 Rebecca Lefton and Daniel J. Weiss, Center for American Progress, “Oil Dependence Is a Dangerous Habit,” 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/01/oil_imports_security.html, December 2010, (accessed December 
14, 2010).12 
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STATA LOG FILE 
 
/// Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
> summarize real_gas_price  futures_open_interest ln_real_ng_price ln_open_interest /// 
>           futures_com_short futures_non_short futures_com_long futures_non_long  
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
real_gas_p~e |       866    5.499106    2.749613   2.077087   17.06117 
futures_op~t |       866    447396.6    254039.3     110254     971774 
ln_real_ng~e |       866    1.590061     .474485   .7309664   2.836805 
ln_open_in~t |       866    12.83409     .617185   11.61054   13.78688 
futures_co~t |       866    238825.6    97523.88      83355     477839 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
futures_no~t |       866    72613.33    89716.68        915     396198 
futures_co~g |       866    240918.1    106063.1      72102     458476 




> var  real_gas_price futures_open_interest 
 
 
Sample:  3 - 866                                   No. of obs      =       864 
Log likelihood =  -9950.31                         AIC             =  23.05627 
FPE            =  3.53e+07                         HQIC            =  23.07737 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  3.45e+07                         SBIC            =  23.11138 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
real_gas_price        5     .435943   0.9750   33718.48   0.0000 
futures_open_i~t      5     13558.1   0.9972   303494.1   0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 












         L1. |    1.20279   .0330789    36.36   0.000     1.137956    1.267623 
         L2. |  -.2248819   .0331323    -6.79   0.000      -.28982   -.1599438 
futures_op~t | 
         L1. |   2.24e-06   1.08e-06     2.08   0.038     1.28e-07    4.36e-06 
         L2. |  -2.14e-06   1.08e-06    -1.98   0.048    -4.25e-06   -1.80e-08 




L1. |   1829.388   1028.777     1.78   0.075    -186.9777    3845.754 
         L2. |  -1709.183   1030.438    -1.66   0.097    -3728.804     310.438 
futures_op~t | 
         L1. |   1.150931    .033586    34.27   0.000     1.085104    1.216759 
         L2. |  -.1529734   .0335965    -4.55   0.000    -.2188213   -.0871256 





   Granger causality Wald tests 
  +------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
  |          Equation           Excluded |   chi2     df Prob > chi2 | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |    real_gas_price  futures_open_in~t |  6.5436     2    0.038    | 
  |    real_gas_price                ALL |  6.5436     2    0.038    | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  | futures_open_in~t     real_gas_price |  3.3504     2    0.187    | 
  | futures_open_in~t                ALL |  3.3504     2    0.187    | 
  +------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
.  




Sample:  3 - 866                                   No. of obs      =       864 
Log likelihood =  2762.098                         AIC             = -6.370597 
FPE            =  5.87e-06                         HQIC            = -6.349503 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  5.73e-06                         SBIC            = -6.315486 
 







ln_real_ng_price      5     .067937   0.9796   41549.86   0.0000 
ln_open_interest      5      .03553   0.9967   259921.7   0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




         L1. |   1.126571   .0336573    33.47   0.000     1.060604    1.192538 
         L2. |  -.1471069   .0336764    -4.37   0.000    -.2131115   -.0811023 
ln_open_in~t | 
         L1. |   .1478069     .06494     2.28   0.023     .0205268    .2750871 
         L2. |  -.1380233   .0649414    -2.13   0.034    -.2653061   -.0107405 




         L1. |    .034977   .0176024     1.99   0.047     .0004768    .0694771 
         L2. |  -.0347661   .0176125    -1.97   0.048     -.069286   -.0002463 
ln_open_in~t | 
         L1. |    1.06969   .0339631    31.50   0.000     1.003124    1.136257 
L2. |  -.0722524   .0339638    -2.13   0.033    -.1388202   -.0056846 





   Granger causality Wald tests 
  +------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
  |          Equation           Excluded |   chi2     df Prob > chi2 | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |  ln_real_ng_price   ln_open_interest |  8.6143     2    0.013    | 
  |  ln_real_ng_price                ALL |  8.6143     2    0.013    | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |  ln_open_interest   ln_real_ng_price |  3.9645     2    0.138    | 
  |  ln_open_interest                ALL |  3.9645     2    0.138    | 
  +------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
.  












Log likelihood = -9620.346                         AIC             =  22.29247 
FPE            =  1.65e+07                         HQIC            =  22.31356 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  1.61e+07                         SBIC            =  22.34758 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
real_gas_price        5     .436602   0.9749   33614.23   0.0000 
futures_com_sh~t      5     9262.33   0.9910   95225.77   0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




         L1. |   1.200636   .0333524    36.00   0.000     1.135267    1.266005 
         L2. |  -.2225302   .0333075    -6.68   0.000    -.2878116   -.1572487 
futures_co~t | 
         L1. |   5.88e-07   1.56e-06     0.38   0.707    -2.48e-06    3.65e-06 
         L2. |  -2.50e-07   1.57e-06    -0.16   0.873    -3.32e-06    2.82e-06 




         L1. |   3349.771   707.5573     4.73   0.000     1962.985    4736.558 
         L2. |   -3475.84   706.6053    -4.92   0.000    -4860.761   -2090.919 
futures_co~t | 
         L1. |   1.158688   .0331852    34.92   0.000     1.093646    1.223729 
         L2. |   -.163795   .0332232    -4.93   0.000    -.2289113   -.0986786 





   Granger causality Wald tests 
  +------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
  |          Equation           Excluded |   chi2     df Prob > chi2 | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |    real_gas_price  futures_com_short |  3.9194     2    0.141    | 
  |    real_gas_price                ALL |  3.9194     2    0.141    | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  | futures_com_short     real_gas_price |  24.505     2    0.000    | 
  | futures_com_short                ALL |  24.505     2    0.000    | 











Sample:  3 - 866                                   No. of obs      =       864 
Log likelihood = -9259.676                         AIC             =  21.45758 
FPE            =   7144328                         HQIC            =  21.47868 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =   6980847                         SBIC            =  21.51269 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
real_gas_price        5     .437255   0.9749   33511.26   0.0000 
futures_non_sh~t      5     6101.96   0.9954   186947.6   0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




         L1. |   1.210243   .0333555    36.28   0.000     1.144867    1.275619 
         L2. |  -.2273802   .0334715    -6.79   0.000    -.2929832   -.1617773 
futures_no~t | 
         L1. |   2.64e-06   2.32e-06     1.14   0.255    -1.91e-06    7.18e-06 
         L2. |  -2.60e-06   2.32e-06    -1.12   0.263    -7.14e-06    1.95e-06 




         L1. |  -1881.614   465.4817    -4.04   0.000    -2793.942   -969.2869 
         L2. |    2093.16   467.1003     4.48   0.000      1177.66    3008.659 
futures_no~t | 
         L1. |   1.273068   .0323442    39.36   0.000     1.209675    1.336462 
         L2. |   -.277184   .0323705    -8.56   0.000    -.3406289   -.2137391 





   Granger causality Wald tests 
  +------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
|          Equation           Excluded |   chi2     df Prob > chi2 | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |    real_gas_price  futures_non_short |  1.3272     2    0.515    | 









  | futures_non_short     real_gas_price |   24.74     2    0.000    | 
  | futures_non_short                ALL |   24.74     2    0.000    | 
  +------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
.  




Sample:  3 - 866                                   No. of obs      =       864 
Log likelihood = -9605.735                         AIC             =  22.25865 
FPE            =  1.59e+07                         HQIC            =  22.27974 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  1.56e+07                         SBIC            =  22.31376 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
real_gas_price        5     .436878   0.9749   33570.62   0.0000 
futures_com_long      5     9086.81   0.9927   117128.3   0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




         L1. |    1.20581   .0332005    36.32   0.000     1.140738    1.270882 
         L2. |  -.2259098   .0331987    -6.80   0.000    -.2909781   -.1608416 
futures_co~g | 
         L1. |   1.46e-06   1.62e-06     0.90   0.369    -1.72e-06    4.64e-06 
         L2. |  -1.23e-06   1.62e-06    -0.76   0.448    -4.41e-06    1.95e-06 




         L1. |  -1743.704   690.5511    -2.53   0.012     -3097.16   -390.2489 
         L2. |   1840.089   690.5139     2.66   0.008     486.7061    3193.471 
futures_co~g | 
         L1. |   1.099782   .0337299    32.61   0.000     1.033672    1.165891 
         L2. |  -.1054234   .0337335    -3.13   0.002    -.1715399   -.0393068 










Granger causality Wald tests 
  +------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
  |          Equation           Excluded |   chi2     df Prob > chi2 | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |    real_gas_price   futures_com_long |  2.8215     2    0.244    | 
  |    real_gas_price                ALL |  2.8215     2    0.244    | 
|--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |  futures_com_long     real_gas_price |  7.3841     2    0.025    | 
  |  futures_com_long                ALL |  7.3841     2    0.025    | 
  +------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
.  




Sample:  3 - 866                                   No. of obs      =       864 
Log likelihood = -9227.156                         AIC             =  21.38231 
FPE            =   6626271                         HQIC            =   21.4034 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =   6474645                         SBIC            =  21.43742 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
real_gas_price        5     .437306   0.9749   33503.31   0.0000 
futures_non_long      5     5859.39   0.9828   49441.37   0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 




         L1. |   1.204946   .0332725    36.21   0.000     1.139734    1.270159 
         L2. |  -.2248425    .033341    -6.74   0.000    -.2901897   -.1594954 
futures_no~g | 
         L1. |   2.59e-07   2.46e-06     0.11   0.916    -4.55e-06    5.07e-06 
         L2. |   1.59e-07   2.46e-06     0.06   0.948    -4.66e-06    4.98e-06 




         L1. |   2153.853   445.8126     4.83   0.000     1280.076     3027.63 
         L2. |  -2059.336   446.7312    -4.61   0.000    -2934.913   -1183.759 
futures_no~g | 








 L2. |  -.2084536   .0329252    -6.33   0.000    -.2729857   -.1439214 





   Granger causality Wald tests 
  +------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
  |          Equation           Excluded |   chi2     df Prob > chi2 | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |    real_gas_price   futures_non_long |  1.1271     2    0.569    | 
  |    real_gas_price                ALL |  1.1271     2    0.569    | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------------| 
  |  futures_non_long     real_gas_price |  23.828     2    0.000    | 
  |  futures_non_long                ALL |  23.828     2    0.000    | 




. summarize real_gas_price futures_open_interest ln_real_ng_price  ln_open_interest /// 
>           futures_com_short futures_non_short futures_com_long futures_non_long 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
real_gas_p~e |       866    5.499106    2.749613   2.077087   17.06117 
futures_op~t |       866    447396.6    254039.3     110254     971774 
ln_real_ng~e |       866    1.590061     .474485   .7309664   2.836805 
ln_open_in~t |       866    12.83409     .617185   11.61054   13.78688 
futures_co~t |       866    238825.6    97523.88      83355     477839 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
futures_no~t |       866    72613.33    89716.68        915     396198 
futures_co~g |       866    240918.1    106063.1      72102     458476 
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